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Multichannel sales systems have become the norm in business-
to-business (B2B) markets (Lawrence et al. 2019; Sa Vinhas
and Heide 2015). Of the different sales channels that B2B
companies (principal) employ, at least one is an indirect chan-
nel (agent) (e.g., dealers, external online shops). This is the
case for most—almost 80%—of B2B manufacturers (CMO
Survey 2019), likely provoking agency conflicts (e.g., Antia,
Mani, and Wathne 2017; Heide 2003; Srinivasan 2006).
Thereby, the scale of such agency conflicts likely depends on
the design of multichannel sales systems. Manufacturers com-
bine direct and indirect channels to different extents, and these
channels typically vary in their economic importance for the
manufacturer (i.e., relative revenue contributions) (e.g., Sa
Vinhas and Anderson 2005; Van Bruggen et al. 2010).
The design choices within multichannel sales systems can
attenuate or aggravate agency conflicts. Increased direct chan-
nel usage1 may provide manufacturers with reference standards
for sales partner management, thereby reducing agency con-
flicts (Dutta et al. 1995; Heide 2003). However, direct channel
usage may also induce agency conflict. For example, sales
partners may benefit from the manufacturer’s presales activi-
ties and reduce their own selling efforts (Sa Vinhas and Heide
2015).
Similarly, increased indirect channel usage may make man-
ufacturers particularly vulnerable to shirking or misdirected
efforts by sales partners (Zeng et al. 2015; Zheng et al.
2020). For example, in 2018, when the BMW Group tried to
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enforce novel contracts with its indirect sales partners, it expe-
rienced substantial resistance: 90% of BMW’s indirect sales
partners joined forces to combat the novel contract terms, even
jointly threatening BMW with terminating their current con-
tracts (Fasse 2018). Relatedly, a manager of a large manufac-
turer of cutting tools and services that distributes products
through direct and indirect channels informed us that 17 to
20 of his sales partners from various sales channels recently
formed a purchasing cooperative, which led to a feud. In addi-
tion to cooperating on the terms of negotiations, the sales part-
ners began producing the manufacturer’s product on their own.
Prior research (reviewed in Table 1) has investigated differ-
ences between multichannel and nonmultichannel settings but
has hardly explored design differences within multichannel
sales systems. Specifically, very little is known about the
effects of direct and indirect channel usage. Consequently, the
jury is out as to how companies can counterbalance potential
agency conflicts that degrees of direct and indirect channel
usage provoke.
Governance mechanisms may represent one effective way
to mitigate such agency concerns and increase manufacturer
performance (Antia, Mani, and Wathne 2017). Agency theory
proposes that formalized “rules of the game” (Fama and Jensen
1983, p. 302) reduce conflict and lower “ex post costs through
ex ante alignment” of manufacturer and sales partner interests
(Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992, p. 8). Thus, we explore the
role of formalization, or the degree to which fixed and written
rules, polices, and procedures govern sales partner decision
making in a channel system (Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, and Thomas
2007). In addition, the delegation of decision making authority
to sales partners and information asymmetry between manu-
facturers and sales partners stimulate agency conflicts in the
first place (Eisenhardt 1989; Hoenen and Kostova 2015). Thus,
we include centralization (i.e., the degree to which decision
making authority in a channel system is concentrated at the
manufacturer level; Dwyer and Welsh 1985) to mitigate the
former, and we include information exchange (i.e., bilateral
expectation that manufacturers and indirect sales partners will
provide each other with useful information; Heide and John
1992) to reduce the latter.
In practice, companies likely decide simultaneously on
multichannel design and governance mechanisms (Heide,
Kumar, and Wathne 2014), which affects their performance
results (Ghosh and John 1999, 2005). For example, rigid for-
mal governance might gain importance with increasing indi-
rect channel usage to control sales partner behaviors.
However, such rules may restrict manufacturers’ flexibility
in reacting to new circumstances and thus undermine their
performance outcomes for direct channel usage. Remarkably,
such alignment between governance choice and multichannel
design remains largely unexplored (Table 1). The importance
of this research gap becomes apparent in light of recent find-
ings: Depending on the multichannel design (i.e., single vs.
multichannel settings), the performance effects of the same
governance mechanism can reverse from positive to negative
(Heide, Kumar, and Wathne 2014).
Against this background, our overall research goal is to
establish how multichannel design (direct and indirect usage)
affects manufacturer performance contingent on governance
mechanisms. Essentially, we develop two theoretical ideas.
First, drawing on multiple agency theory, we investigate the
idea that multichannel system design affects the individual
manufacturer–sales partner relationship. Second, we integrate
multiple agency theory and governance value analysis and
develop alignment effects between multichannel design and
governance mechanisms. To aid our empirical investigation,
we compiled a unique data set. We collected primary data from
a broad range of multichannel manufacturers from different
industries that we enriched with objective performance data
from archival data sources. In addition, we collected matched
sales partner data. Such a design is rare, but it allows us to
address calls from prior investigators to demonstrate the effects
of multichannel design for both sides of the manufacturer–sales
partner dyad (Sa Vinhas and Heide 2011; Sa Vinhas and John-
son 2019).
We offer three contributions through our research. First, we
introduce multiple agency theory to the multichannel context.
In doing so, we extend the idea that “individual relationships
(between manufacturers and sales partners) are embedded in a
context of other relationships that could have governance
implications” (Heide 1994, p. 81). Moreover, we integrate
agency theory with governance value analysis. We find that
agency mechanisms not only instill order but also create value
(e.g., Heide, Kumar, and Wathne 2014).
Second, we address calls for extending research on the
design of multichannel sales systems (e.g., ISBM 2020; MSI
2018; Sa Vinhas and Johnson 2019). Prior research has exam-
ined the outcomes of moving from a single channel to multi-
channel settings (e.g., Dutta et al. 1995), but researchers have
only begun investigating design consequences within multiple
sales channels (Antia, Mani, and Wathne 2017; Srinivasan
2006). We extend initial research on how design variation
within a multichannel context affects both manufacturer per-
formance and matched sales partner behavior. In addition, we
contribute to the literature by introducing indirect and direct
channel usage as focal design elements. In doing so, we address
calls to extend prior measurements of channel usage to the
multichannel context (Van Bruggen et al. 2010).
Third, we contribute to the governance literature by addres-
sing calls for exploring the alignment between governance
mechanisms and channel design (Frazier 1999; Heide, Kumar,
and Wathne 2014), which thus far has remained largely unex-
plored (Table 1). Extending prior literature, we demonstrate
that the same governance mechanism (e.g., formalization) can
enhance manufacturer performance in one setting (e.g., aligned
with indirect channel usage) but diminish manufacturer perfor-
mance in the other (e.g., aligned with direct channel usage). In
doing so, we also extend literature on formalization, centraliza-
tion, and information exchange, which has largely investigated
their performance effects in a context that differs greatly from
the reality of today’s multichannel sales systems (e.g., Boyle
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and Dwyer 1995). We show that these governance mechanisms
are still effective when aligned with multichannel design.
Theoretical Background and Conceptual
Model
Multichannel Design and Direct and Indirect Channel
Usage
Multichannel sales systems refer to manufacturers simultane-
ously employing multiple sales channels to sell the same prod-
ucts in the same sales region (e.g., Sa Vinhas and Anderson
2005; Sa Vinhas and Heide 2015). Such systems comprise dual
distribution (reliance on both direct and indirect channels) and
nondual distribution systems (reliance on either direct or indi-
rect channels) (e.g., Antia, Mani, and Wathne 2017; Heide
2003). Overall, multichannel sales systems can differ in the
type of channels (direct vs. indirect dimension) and number
of channels installed (variety dimension) as well as in the
extent to which each channel is used (intensity dimension)
(e.g., Ka¨uferle and Reinartz 2015; we provide an illustrative
example in the “Measurement” section). However, companies
do not independently decide on these dimensions: After having
decided on the type and number of channels, manufacturers
need to decide on their intensity of usage (Van Bruggen et al.
2010). Thus, we consider all dimensions jointly. Prior research
has followed a similar approach (Sa Vinhas and Anderson
2005) and suggests advantages in jointly considering both
dimensions (see the findings Antia, Mani, and Wathne [2017]
and Jindal et al. [2007] report in their post hoc tests).2
We differentiate between direct and indirect channel usage
by combining direct versus indirect, variety, and intensity
dimensions. We define direct (indirect) channel usage (i.e.,
direct vs. indirect dimension) as the extent to which companies
install (i.e., variety dimension) and use (i.e., intensity dimen-
sion) direct (indirect) channels that transact in the same geo-
graphy and sell the same product. As relationships between
manufacturers and their sales partners are embedded in these
systems, channel research reveals that evaluating these rela-
tionships from an agency perspective is particularly fruitful
(e.g., Grewal et al. 2013).
Multiple Agency Perspective on Multichannel Design
In agency relationships, one party (the principal) engages
another party (the agent) to undertake an action on its behalf
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976). In such a relationship, the
problem of moral hazard may arise if an agent refuses to per-
form the contractually agreed-on behavior. In an indirect chan-
nel, such problems of moral hazard derive from the delegation
of decision making authority to the sales partner and
information asymmetry (i.e., sales partners being better
informed about markets or transactions), which likely prevents
detection of moral hazard (e.g., Bergen, Dutta, and Walker
1992; Eisenhardt 1989).
Although agency theory has traditionally focused on a dya-
dic manufacturer–sales partner perspective, individual relation-
ships between manufacturers and sales partners are embedded
in a larger context that likely has important governance impli-
cations (Heide 1994). Therefore, we draw on multiple agency
theory, which also considers interactions between agents (Hoe-
nen and Kostova 2015). Specifically, we develop the idea that
manufacturers might use direct channels to reduce information
asymmetry and in turn manage indirect channels (in agency
terminology, agents [direct channel] are used to manage other
agents [indirect channels] [Bohn 1987; Varian 1990]). In addi-
tion, multiple agency theory also suggests that interactions
between agents (e.g., other indirect channels) can result in
opportunism against the principal (e.g., Holmstro¨m and Mil-
grom 1990; Tirole 1986). Thus, multiple agency theory sug-
gests that multichannel design can have an impact on sales
partners. Drawing on governance value analysis, we will
explore how these effects influence manufacturer performance.
Governing Multichannel Sales Systems for Financial
Performance
The core guiding principle of agency theory is to lower poten-
tial agency costs. These costs comprise direct costs (e.g., con-
tract costs) but also costs of lost opportunities (i.e., differences
in the principal’s welfare due to divergence between the
agent’s decisions and decisions that would maximize the prin-
cipal’s welfare) (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976). Governance
value analysis emphasizes that minimizing such direct and
opportunity costs equates with value creation. According to
theory, profit-maximizing manufacturers and sales partners
will pursue strategies that maximize their joint value because
this will maximize their own profits simultaneously (Ghosh
and John 1999), a prediction that Ghosh and John (2005) con-
firm empirically. However, governance value analysis also
suggests that to unfold such a value creation potential, a con-
tingent alignment perspective is necessary. Specifically, gov-
ernance value analysis emphasizes the alignment between firm
resources (e.g., the design of a multichannel sales system) and
governance mechanisms. Initial research shows that beneficial
effects of channel design on performance unfold in combina-
tion with effective governance mechanisms (Antia, Mani, and
Wathne 2017; Heide, Kumar, and Wathne 2014).
Drawing on agency theory, we considered formalization,
centralization, and information exchange to be important gov-
ernance mechanisms. Agency theory refers to the “metaphor of
a contract” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 58) as a focal way to resolve
agency conflicts. In line with prior research, we interpret con-
tracts in an economic sense as means to create a shared set of
rules, procedures, and responsibilities (Hendry 2002). Forma-
lization specifies and codifies the behavior of sales partners in
channel relationships by introducing fixed and written rules,
2 We acknowledge a different perspective that argues it is sufficient to focus on
the presence in a channel without considering the intensity of usage (e.g., Heide
2003). In a robustness test, we estimated a model focused only on the number
of channels and obtained largely similar results.
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policies, and procedures that limit the sales partner’s opportu-
nity to pursue its own goals at the expense of the manufacturer.
Thus, we argue that formalization maps onto agency theory’s
contract metaphor.
Moreover, a common assumption of agency theory is that
manufacturers and sales partners are guided by self-interest
and pursue different goals (e.g., regarding assortment deci-
sions). Thus, the delegation of decision making authority to
sales partners is likely responsible for creating agency con-
flicts in the first place (Eisenhardt 1989; Hoenen and Kostova
2015). Consequently, centralization of decision making
authority at the manufacturer level might lower the costs of
agency conflicts.3
Finally, information asymmetry likely reduces manufactur-
ers’ ability to detect sales partner shirking or misdirected
efforts. Sales partners typically hold an information advantage
over manufacturers (e.g., sales partners may possess deeper
market and customer knowledge; Frazier et al. 2009). Thus,
maintaining information exchange between manufacturers and
indirect channels likely lowers agency conflicts.
Hypothesis Development from a Contingent
Alignment Perspective
To provide an overview of our logic, we summarize our pre-
dictions in Figure 1. Governance value analysis suggests that
financial performance effects for the manufacturer result from
the alignment between multichannel design (indirect and direct
channel usage) and governance mechanisms (formalization,
centralization, and information exchange). Thus, we develop
our hypotheses from a contingent alignment perspective (main
study). However, we will first draw on multiple agency theory
to develop baseline effects of multichannel design on sales
partners in terms of information asymmetry (sales partners’
information advantage over the manufacturer) and sales partner
moral hazard. We investigate those baseline effects in a sepa-
rate validation study.
Baseline Effects of Direct Channel Usage on Sales
Partner Behavior
Increasing direct channel usage may have downside effects in
that, compared to indirect channels, direct channels might be
less responsive to market developments and require substantial
and binding investments (e.g., Bradach 1997; Srinivasan 2006).
However, increased direct channel usage might have beneficial
effects such as decreasing sales partners’ information advan-
tage over the manufacturer and reducing moral hazard
concerns.
Information asymmetry. Agency theory treats information as a
commodity that can be “purchased” (e.g., Eisenhardt 1989).
Design of Multichannel Sales 
System
Financial 
performance (EBIT)
H1a
Indirect channel usage
Channel Governance Mechanisms
Formalization
Direct channel usage
Centralization
H1b
Variables included in main study
Sales Partner Behaviors
Information advantage of 
sales Partner 
(information asymmetry)
Sales partner cooperation with 
manufacturer 
(moral hazard)
Information 
exchange
H2a
H2b
H3a
H3b
Variables included in validation study
Figure 1. Conceptual framework.
Notes: In our main study, we assess the financial performance outcomes for the manufacturer. In line with governance value analysis, we develop
our hypotheses from a contingency alignment perspective. Thus, we develop hypotheses exclusively for the solid lines. In a validation study, we
investigate the impact of multichannel sales system design on sales partner behaviors to test predictions derived from multiple agency theory.
3 Formalization and centralization represent the two key dimensions of a firm’s
bureaucratic governance structure (Heide 2003), which represents “one of the
most important ways of coordinating activities” (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and
Volberda 2006, p. 1663). We do not include participation because it is closely
related to centralization, and both can be regarded as lying on one continuum.
Defining centralization as “the extent to which the decision making is
concentrated in the hands of a few individuals” and participation as “the
degree of involvement of others in the decision-making process” illustrates
our argument (Paswan, Dant, and Lumpkin 1998, p. 127). The multitude of
channels and potential interactions between them render governance
mechanisms, such as monitoring each channel’s actions, difficult and costly.
Homburg et al. 5
Manufacturers might “purchase” information through in-depth,
firsthand experience with direct channel usage. Manufacturers
that use various direct channels likely obtain important market
know-how (e.g., insights from direct customer contact) and
procedural knowledge (e.g., resource requirements for sales
processes) (Heide 2003) that sales partners otherwise typically
hold, lowering information asymmetry (Frazier al. 2009).
Moral hazard. Such knowledge can favorably spill over to sales
partner management and reduce moral hazard. In agency ter-
minology, knowledge accumulated through one agent (direct
channel) can be used to manage another agent (indirect chan-
nel) (Bohn 1987; Varian 1990). Bradach and Eccles (1989)
elaborate that combining franchisee channels with company-
owned channels can provide reference standards for evaluating
franchisee performance. Research confirms this prediction:
Direct sales channels can act as “yardsticks” to evaluate indi-
rect channels (Dutta et al. 1995), or companies can leverage
internally generated information to evaluate supplier perfor-
mance (Heide 2003). Thus, sales partners might anticipate that
manufacturers’ internal reference standards (i.e., reduced infor-
mation asymmetry) help them detect moral hazard (e.g., Antia,
Mani, and Wathne 2017).
In addition, manufacturers’ strong engagement in multiple
direct channels could serve as a credible threat to replace sales
partners, further reducing potential moral hazard and resulting
in enforcement benefits (Antia, Mani, and Wathne 2017). In
line with our rationale, research reports that concurrent sour-
cing (i.e., buyers internally producing some proportion of the
materials they purchase externally) can indeed lower supplier
opportunism (Heide, Kumar, and Wathne 2014).4
Baseline Effects of Indirect Channel Usage on Sales
Partner Behavior
A likely expectation is that indirect channel usage allows man-
ufacturers to benefit from sales partners’ expertise and timely
responses to market developments (Srinivasan 2006). How-
ever, indirect channel usage likely increases moral hazard con-
cerns and does not lower the manufacturer’s information
disadvantage compared with sales partners.
Information asymmetry. Theoretically, similar to direct channel
usage, learning from diverse and important indirect channels
may lower sales partners’ information advantage over the man-
ufacturer (e.g., reference standards from indirect channels to
evaluate other indirect channels) (Butt et al. 2018). However,
important tacit knowledge that manufacturers develop from
direct channel usage can hardly be obtained from other sources
such as indirect channel usage (Kogut and Zander 1992). In
addition, explicit knowledge gained from indirect channel
usage might also be lower since sales partners may withhold
or distort information (e.g., Williamson 1985). For instance,
sales partners may withhold information to prevent a common
manufacturer from sharing this information with their compet-
itors (Butt et al. 2018). In line with our reasoning, Heide (2003)
observes that adding direct channels, but not indirect channels,
reduces information asymmetry.
Moral hazard. Multiple agency theory suggests that indirect
channel usage increases moral hazard concerns due to compe-
tition or cooperation between indirect channels (e.g., Holm-
strom 1982; Tirole 1986). Notably, research demonstrates
that cooperative and competitive behavior can occur simulta-
neously; thus, both paths are not mutually exclusive (Luo,
Rindfleisch, and Tse 2007; Tsai 2002; Zeng et al. 2015). Sa
Vinhas and Heide’s (2015) idea that dual distribution can
induce competition between direct and indirect channels can
also be transferred to an increase in competition between indi-
rect channels. In B2B settings, indirect channels compete for
scarce manufacturer resources (e.g., technical support or prod-
uct adaptations), likely provoking opportunistic sales partner
behavior. For example, sales partners may begin selling prod-
ucts through unauthorized channels, undermining the manufac-
turer’s sales channel management. Research confirms that
competition between indirect channels results in opportunistic
behaviors against the manufacturer (Zeng et al. 2015).
Sales partners may, however, also demonstrate cooperative
behaviors among each other. Representatives from indirect
channels may hold regional meetings and exchange informa-
tion or run joint promotions or events (El Akremi, Mignonac,
and Perrigot 2011; Zeng et al. 2015). Bradach (1997) observes
that more senior franchisees train and socialize newer franchi-
sees, which can lead to cooperative behaviors in the future.
Multiple agency theory suggests that such cooperation can
lower the manufacturer’s self-interest-seeking behavior (Holm-
stro¨m and Milgrom 1990; Tirole 1986; Waterman and Meier
1998). Sales partners may jointly withhold or manipulate infor-
mation they share with the manufacturer or directly try to
leverage their bargaining power during negotiations.5 Such
behaviors are consistent with the concept of countervailing
power in marketing channels (Etgar 1976): Less powerful
members join forces to offset the power of a more powerful
partner (“common enemy”). Research finds that franchisees
work together to offset franchisor power (Zheng et al. 2020)
and also reports a significant, positive correlation between
sales partner opportunism and cooperation between sales part-
ners (Zeng et al. 2015).
In the following, we examine how those baseline effects
translate into manufacturer performance. In line with the
4 However, excessive direct channel usage can provoke moral hazard by
intensifying competition between direct and indirect channels (Sa Vinhas
and Heide 2015). For example, the BMW Group’s announcement to expand
its direct channel usage (i.e., expansion in direct online sales) led to sales
partner resistance. Sales partners expected lower margins because they
would compete intensively with direct channels for customers.
5 Multiple agency theory predicts a negative relationship between sales partner
opportunism against the manufacturer and cooperation between sales partners.
However, we also acknowledge that sales partner cooperation may reduce such
opportunistic tendencies (e.g., El Akremi, Mignonac, and Perrigot 2011).
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governance value analysis, we predict that performance out-
comes depend on the alignment between multichannel design
(indirect and direct channel usage) and governance mechan-
isms (formalization, centralization, and information exchange).
Alignment of Multichannel Design and Formalization
Indirect channel usage.We argue that formalization enhances the
performance effects of indirect channel usage. A central pre-
mise of agency theory is that formalizing rules and procedures
likely curtails opportunistic behaviors, which investigators
have confirmed in multichannel settings (Sa Vinhas and Heide
2011). On the one hand, formalization may lower competition
between indirect channels, reducing opportunistic behavior
against the manufacturer. Manufacturers may formalize
responsibilities for their sales partners (e.g., provision of tech-
nical support or product specifications for sales partners),
which may lower perceived competitive pressures (e.g., Sa
Vinhas and Heide 2015). In addition, formalization can lower
competition for customers when manufacturers clearly allocate
customer segments to sales channels. In turn, this may reduce
destructive price competition between indirect channels,
enhancing manufacturer performance. On the other hand,
establishing rules and procedures can guard manufacturers
against the capricious mobilization of power (Sa Vinhas and
Heide 2011). Thus, formalization might also reduce potential
opportunistic sales partner behavior resulting from sales part-
ners exerting countervailing power against the manufacturer.
Curtailing opportunistic tendencies from indirect channel
usage through formalization will translate into increased finan-
cial performance. Manufacturers can then benefit from sales
partners’ expertise and their quick reaction to market develop-
ments (Srinivasan 2006). Thus:
H1a: Aligning indirect channel usage and formalization
enhances financial performance outcomes for the
manufacturer.
Direct channel usage. We expect that the agency cost calculus
likely reverses when aligning direct channel usage with forma-
lization. In contrast with indirect channel usage, the
opportunism-reducing role of formalization is less important
when manufacturers generate revenue from many direct chan-
nels. Through the design of the multichannel sales system,
manufacturers lower sales partners’ information advantage
(Heide 2003) and reduce exchange partner opportunism
(Heide, Kumar, and Wathne 2014).
However, when manufacturers use various direct channels,
formalization is likely to become a burden, as formalization
reduces manufacturers’ scope of action. For example, forma-
lized support for sales partners (e.g., technical support) might
restrict manufacturers’ potential to leverage their increased
knowledge base (Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005) and reduce
decision-making speed (Baum and Wally 2003). In agency
terminology, formalization lowers the principal’s opportunity
to engage in self-interest-seeking behavior. Thus, with
increasing formalization, opportunity costs “of not shifting to
more profitable activities in light of new information” (Ghosh
and John 1999, p. 132) arise, in turn lowering financial perfor-
mance. Thus:
H1b: Aligning direct channel usage and formalization
diminishes financial performance outcomes for the
manufacturer.
Alignment of Multichannel Design and Centralization
Indirect channel usage. We argue that centralization reduces the
performance effects of indirect channel usage. First, centraliza-
tion will amplify the negative effects of countervailing power
that indirect channel usage provokes. Bosse and Phillips (2016)
establish that the actions of agents follow the norm of bounded
self-interest. This implies that sales partners reciprocate unfair
treatments, which can exacerbate agency problems. Sales part-
ners likely perceive centralization as an intrusive governance
mechanism that reduces their self-control (Sa Vinhas and
Heide 2011), thus creating perceptions of a tilted playing field
(Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005) and reducing perceived fair-
ness. As a likely consequence, sales partners are incentivized to
reciprocate by exerting countervailing power against the man-
ufacturer (e.g., withholding information).
Second, aligning centralization and indirect channel usage
will not only increase such moral hazard concerns but also
amplify their negative performance effects. For centralization
to improve the outcomes of indirect channel usage, the focal
premise is that manufacturers can adequately specify which
sales partner actions best serve their interests. However, when
orchestrating multiple and important indirect channels, manu-
facturers’ “honest incompetence” (Hendry 2002, p. 100) result-
ing from bounded rationality likely prevents accurate
specifications. Bounded rationality arises from limited
information-processing capacities, reliance on shortcuts and
heuristics, and cognitive biases (Foss and Weber 2016). Man-
ufacturers who use multiple indirect channels, must access
many different information sources that might exceed their
information-processing capacities. At the same time, amplified
moral hazard concerns likely lead sales partners to withhold
information or even distort the information they share with the
manufacturer (Tsai 2002; Williamson 1985). Thus, manufac-
turers are likely to rely more strongly on information that is
readily available to them (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). If so,
they may unconsciously rely too much on firsthand knowledge
accumulated from direct channels or even “gut feeling,” which
can be problematic because sales partners tend to possess more
valuable market knowledge (Frazier et al. 2009).
Consequently, manufacturers might not be able to ade-
quately specify which sales partner actions best serve their
interests and rather provide sales partners with biased specifi-
cations (Hendry 2002). In the extreme, with increasing centra-
lization, a paradox situation might arise in which
manufacturers discourage indirect channels from serving their
more general interests but force them to follow biased
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specifications. Because centralization and indirect channel
usage mutually reinforce each other’s negative effects, we
predict:
H2a: Aligning indirect channel usage and centralization
diminishes financial performance outcomes for the
manufacturer.
Direct channel usage. In contrast, we expect that centralization
likely strengthens performance effects of direct channel usage.
The extended knowledge base that manufacturers accumulate
from various direct channels that contribute important revenue
reduces bounded rationality concerns (i.e., availability bias) to
a large extent. Manufacturers will likely more accurately for-
mulate desired sales partner behavior in this context. Thus,
when aligned with direct channel usage, manufacturers are
likely able to benefit from centralization’s increased
decision-making speed (Baum and Wally 2003), enhancing
positive returns from direct channel usage.
In addition, centralization is less likely to stimulate moral
hazard among sales partners when aligned with direct channel
usage. Firsthand experience can provide legitimacy in sales
partner management, which can reduce (Heide, Kumar, and
Wathne 2014) or even reverse sales partner opportunism
(Bosse and Philipps 2016; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan
2007). For example, in an ethnographic study, Bradach
(1997) observes that franchisees are more likely to accept a
franchisor’s authority if the franchisor also operates its own
outlets. In this case, franchisees respond more favorably to
franchisor control, lowering “persuasion costs.” Thus:
H2b: Aligning direct channel usage and centralization
enhances financial performance outcomes for the
manufacturer.
Alignment of Multichannel Design and Information
Exchange
Indirect channel usage. Aligning indirect channel usage with
information exchange reduces the manufacturer’s financial
performance. On the positive side, high levels of information
exchange with indirect channels may help the manufacturer
reduce its information disadvantage compared with sales part-
ners. However, aligned with indirect channel usage, informa-
tion exchange likely provokes agency costs that exceed such
positive outcomes (Tirole 1986). Research on cooperation
between competitors shows that high levels of exchanged
information between competitors can result in “opportunistic
exploitation” (Luo, Rindfleisch, and Tse 2007; Williamson
1985). Sales partners may jointly use the acquired information
from manufacturers (e.g., process knowledge, cost structures)
to negotiate favorable terms and conditions (Zeng et al. 2015;
Zheng et al. 2020). Thus, manufacturers either face high direct
costs (e.g., price concessions) or they must invest substantially
in safeguarding mechanisms (Ghosh and John 1999), lowering
financial performance.
In addition, competition between indirect channels lowers
individual sales partners’ incentive to exchange information
with the manufacturer in the first place. Sales partners might
anticipate “misappropriation of their information” (Baiman and
Rajan 2002); that is, the same manufacturer may share sales
partner information with competing indirect channels (Butt
et al. 2018). Therefore, to maintain ongoing information
exchange, manufacturers need to invest continuously in the
relationship (e.g., granting access to valuable resources to
maintain relationships) (e.g., Heide 1994), which lowers finan-
cial performance. Thus:
H3a: Aligning indirect channel usage and information
exchange diminishes financial performance outcomes for
the manufacturer.
Direct channel usage. Information exchange with indirect sales
partners likely enhances performance effects of direct channel
usage. The costs of maintaining information exchange are rel-
atively low and have reduced potential of opportunistic exploi-
tation. Manufacturers that dominantly use direct channels
likely have a broader information base than their sales partners
(Bradach 1997). Thus, sales partners acting boundedly self-
interested are likely to reciprocate by sharing information
(e.g., Bosse and Philipps 2016). Individual sales partners may
even anticipate competitive disadvantages if they did not
obtain the same valuable market information as their compet-
itors. Those benefits likely outweigh the fears of “information
misappropriation” and incentivize sales partners to share infor-
mation. In addition, direct channel usage represents a credible
threat for sales partner replacement, and thus, risks that sales
partners will opportunistically exploit the shared information
against the manufacturer are low.
Notably, although manufacturers largely rely on direct
channels, information obtained from sales partners will still
enhance their performance (Tsai 2002). According to Bradach
(1997), sales partner information complements manufacturer
information. Whereas company-internal sources might have a
tendency to please, sales partners might be willing to even
offer negative information or novel aspects that are viable for
manufacturer performance. Relatedly, information exchange
can help coordinate sales partners, further enhancing perfor-
mance. Thus:
H3b: Aligning direct channel usage and information
exchange enhances financial performance outcomes for
the manufacturer.
Methodology
Research Context and Data Collection
Data on our focal constructs (e.g., multichannel characteristics)
are not available from secondary data sources, so we used a
primary field study to test our hypotheses. Because we evaluate
the management of sales partners, our population of interest
comprises B2B firms with at least one indirect sales channel.
We conducted interviews with these companies to gain a
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deeper understanding of multichannel sales management and to
guide our research design. Interviewees encouraged us to also
collect sales partner data to glean further insights. We followed
this advice and collected sales partner data, which we analyzed
in a validation study.
We sent a mail questionnaire to 1,454 manufacturers and
provided an additional 1,500 manufacturers with an online ques-
tionnaire using a business social network. We made several
efforts to encourage participation and increase response rates.
We assured respondent anonymity and offered manufacturers
incentives for participating and for providing sales partner con-
tacts. We made personal telephone calls to manufacturers that
had not returned the questionnaire within four weeks. In
exchange for participation, each respondent received a summary
of the results and a benchmarking report. In addition, we offered
respondents a choice of a free sales management textbook, an
Amazon.com gift coupon of €30, or a donation of €30 to UNI-
CEF. We received usable responses from 519 manufacturers (a
response rate of 18%). We eliminated 20 questionnaires with
incomplete answers, most of which related to our focal con-
structs. For 201 of the 499 remaining respondents, we obtained
objective financial performance data.
We also asked our key informants to provide us with contact
information for purchasing managers or managing directors
from major sales partners. We acquired matched sales partner
data for 103 manufacturers (one to nine different sales partners
per manufacturer participated).
Table 2 shows the composition of our study. To ensure that
our effective sample is representative, we compared it with the
relevant B2B industry distribution for Germany, which we
obtained from the Nexis Uni database (previously LexisNexis),
a widely used database in marketing research (Yang and Gold-
farb 2015). A nonsignificant goodness-of-fit test between our
effective sample (n¼ 499) and the overall industry distribution
indicated no threats to representativeness (w2 ¼ 12.85, p ¼ .46;
H0: equal distribution in both samples). Another goodness-of-
fit test between the matched sample (n ¼ 103) and the overall
industry distribution also indicated no threats to representative-
ness (w2 ¼ 7.87, p ¼ .85).
Measurement
Measurement development. We followed standard psychometric
scale development procedures, generating our measurements
from a review of extant literature (see the Appendix). We used
established scales to measure formalization (e.g., Kabadayi,
Eyuboglu, and Thomas 2007), centralization (e.g., Dwyer and
Welsh 1985), and information exchange (Heide and John
1992). We used earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)
scaled by total assets to ensure comparability between indus-
tries from the AMADEUS database to assess financial
performance.
We extended prior measures to capture indirect and direct
channel usage (e.g., Jindal et al. 2007; Ka¨uferle and Reinartz
2015; Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005). In line with prior
research and discussions with advising managers, we focused
on a set of 11 distinct sales channels for B2B manufacturers to
capture the variety dimension (see Table 3). We distinguish
direct and indirect channels according to customer contact
medium (e.g., personal sales, Internet) (e.g., Jindal et al.
2007). To capture the intensity dimension, key informants
assessed the share of revenue obtained for each channel (pij)
(e.g., Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005).
We rely on an entropy measure (e.g., Groening, Mittal, and
Zhang 2016) to convert the obtained responses into a measure
of channel usage. However, as we demonstrate in the
“Robustness Checks” section, our results are not sensitive to
this choice. The entropy measure captures the number of chan-
nels after accounting for their relative importance (i.e., relative
revenue contribution). An entropy score of 0 refers to a firm
that derives all its revenues from one channel. The entropy
score increases as the number of channels grows and is atte-
nuated by each channel’s relative revenue (e.g., larger revenue
concentration lowers the entropy measure). A firm that uses all
channels and obtains equal revenue from them obtains the
highest value.
To illustrate our calculations, we introduce five fictitious
manufacturers in Table 3. Although the manufacturers are fic-
titious, the general pattern of their sales channels is realistic.
The average manufacturer in our sample employs two indirect
and two direct channels, and all manufacturers rely on at least
one indirect channel. To calculate separate measures for direct
and indirect channels, we rescale the reported relative revenues
to the respective channel category (direct: j ¼ 1; indirect:
j ¼ 2). We divide the observed measures by the proportion
Table 2. Sample Composition.
Industry %
Mechanical engineering and construction 23
Telecommunication/IT 17
Electronics 11
Automotive industry/automotive suppliers 9
Metal processing 7
Chemicals and plastics 6
Building materials 6
Medical engineering and precision mechanics 4
Food and stimulants 4
Pharmaceuticals 4
Printing and paper 3
Textiles 3
Industrial nondurables 3
Position of Respondent %
Director of sales/sales manager 53
Managing director 29
Director sales controlling 19
Sales Volume (in millions of $) %
<10 9
10–25 16
25–50 22
50–100 11
100–500 24
500–1,000 8
>1,000 11
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of sales volume generated in each channel category
p ijP
p ij
 
.
For example, 10% of Manufacturer A’s sales volume stems
from wholesalers (p2,2¼ 10%) and 30% from indirect channels
overall (Spi,2 ¼ 30%). Thus, wholesalers account for one-third
of Manufacturer A’s indirect channel revenues
p2;2P
p1;2
¼ 10%
30%
 
.
As a final step, we adjust our measure by the overall impor-
tance of direct and indirect channels (Ka¨uferle and Reinartz
2015). This need becomes apparent when comparing Manufac-
turers B and C: without adjustments, the resulting entropy
measures would be identical. Thus, we calculate direct (DCU)
and indirect channel usage (ICU) as follows:
DCUj¼1 ¼
X
p ij
X p ijP
p ij
ln
1
p ijP
p ij
0
B@
1
CA; and
ICUj¼2 ¼
X
p ij
X p ijP
p ij
ln
1
p ijP
p ij
0
B@
1
CA;
ð1Þ
where pij refers to the amount of sales volume the manufacturer
reports for sales channel i (i 2 1 [direct sales force], . . . , 11
[external online shops]) in channel category j (j 2 1 [direct
channel] or 2 [indirect channel]).
Table 3 shows that our measures have favorable properties
over alternative measures. Merely counting the number of chan-
nels would disguise managerial differences between Manufac-
turers B and C. Manufacturer C employs predominantly direct
channels that account for 97% of revenue and uses two addi-
tional indirect channels as “test” channels (3% of revenue con-
tribution). By contrast, Manufacturer B generates 30% of its
sales volume from the same indirect channels and thus is more
dependent on these channels (Sa Vinhas and Johnson 2019). Our
measures validly distinguish between the two manufacturers.
Similarly, focusing on the proportion of indirect sales vol-
ume alone cannot sufficiently discriminate manufacturers, such
as Manufacturers D and E. Although both manufacturers
employ only indirect channels (proportion indirect ¼ 100%),
Manufacturer E relies on a different number of indirect chan-
nels, which likely implies more complexity due to potential
channel interactions. Thus, in contrast with measures such as
the proportion of indirect sales volume, our measures better
capture the unique characteristics of multichannel settings.
Controls. In addition to the focal theoretical variables, we
include an extensive set of control variables. In doing so, we
preclude potential confounds and account for key dimensions
by which multichannel design and governance decisions are
affected. Specifically, following agency theory, we control for
information asymmetry (i.e., manufacturer’s information dis-
advantage) (Frazier et al. 2009; Heide 2003). In addition, we
include channel management controls. In this way, we account
for distribution selectivity, contractual binding, governance
expenses, and governance enforcement (Sa Vinhas and Heide
2015). Moreover, because companies’ strategic orientations
can guide them in selecting their multichannel design and
exchange partners, we account for companies’ customer and
cost orientation (Jindal et al. 2007; Ka¨uferle and Reinartz
2015). Finally, we account for industry concentration, which
can affect the design of multichannel systems and governance
choices (e.g., Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, and Thomas 2007). Table 4
shows the correlations of all measures.
Measure Validity
Measurement assessment. We conducted a confirmatory factor
analysis that contained all reflectively measured constructs to
assess their reliability and validity. We found acceptable model
fit (comparative fit index ¼ .93, root mean square error of
approximation ¼ .05, standardized root mean square residual
¼ .05). Overall, the analysis had satisfactory results:
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
EBIT margina .08 .09 —
Direct channel usage .08 .19 .05 —
Indirect channel usage .21 .29 -.07 .03 —
Formalization 4.74 1.51 .02 .02 .16 .85
Centralization 3.63 1.25 .02 .05 .01 .57 .72
Information exchange 5.05 1.22 .07 .03 .01 .42 .38 .83
Distribution selectivity 3.99 1.92 .07 .35 .33 .07 .22 .11 .77
Information asymmetry 3.83 1.43 .14 .11 .08 .03 .19 .12 .06 .85
Contractual binding 3.25 1.43 .19 .22 .06 .30 .35 .27 .32 .01 .93
Enforcement 3.90 1.40 .05 .31 .10 .25 .41 .35 .19 .03 .32 .76
Governance expenses 3.17 1.22 .08 .10 .30 .24 .08 .10 .22 .04 .03 .18 .81
Customer orientation 5.74 .95 .04 .06 .23 .15 .17 .22 .20 .02 .20 .11 .05 .76
Cost orientation 4.95 1.06 .14 .07 .07 .18 .18 .07 .12 .06 .11 .26 .14 .17 .69
Industry concentration .15 .25 .11 -.11 .03 .11 -.02 .11 .03 .02 .03 .07 .11 .11 .08 —
Notes: Absolute values larger than |.20| are significant at p < .05 (two-tailed tests). The square roots of the AVE are on the diagonal. aObtained from an
independent financial database.
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Composite reliability, average variance extracted (AVE),
Cronbach’s alpha, and all indicator reliabilities exceed the rec-
ommended threshold values for all constructs (see the Appen-
dix) (e.g., Bagozzi and Baumgartner 1994). Only the cost
orientation construct falls slightly below the suggested thresh-
old value of .50 for AVE. However, slight deviations are accep-
table, particularly because all other threshold values are met.
Moreover, we find no evidence against discriminant validity
because the square roots of the AVE from each pair of variables
exceed their correlation (Table 4) (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
Key informant bias. We checked whether key informants were
sufficiently competent to answer our questions by asking for
their job experience (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993). Key
informants’ average job experience of 19.8 years (SD ¼ 8.6)
indicated that they were able to provide accurate answers.
Moreover, most of our constructs pertained to the current sit-
uation, were internal to the firm, and were objectively verifi-
able. Key informants tend to evaluate these constructs
accurately (Homburg et al. 2012). Finally, we verified key
informants’ responses by comparing subjective and objective
measures of sales volume for manufacturers available on the
AMADEUS database. The high correlation coefficient (r¼ .78,
p < .01) indicates that key informant bias is not a problem.
Common method bias.Our study’s design largely dispels the risk
of potential common method bias because we rely on different
data sources to capture the independent and dependent vari-
ables. Moreover, analytical and simulation studies suggest that
common method bias does not create but only deflates interac-
tion effects (e.g., Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010).
Model Specification
Our research objectives and our survey methodology imposed
several constraints that we accounted for when we specified our
model. First, we needed to account for sampling-induced endo-
geneity from two sources: (1) Owing to less-than-
comprehensive public disclosure requirements, we could not
obtain financial performance data for many family-,
foundation-, or state-owned companies, and (2) we did not
receive sales partner contacts from all manufacturers. Second,
the design of multichannel sales systems and the choice of
governance mechanisms do not follow from a random assign-
ment but a strategic choice (e.g., anticipated future perfor-
mance), so we had to account for this second type of
endogeneity. Third, we checked for multicollinearity, which
does not seem to threaten the results of our analyses (largest
variance inflation factor is lower than 5 and condition indices
are lower than 10).
Sampling-induced endogeneity
We first specified the theorized effects of multichannel design
and governance mechanisms on manufacturer performance as
follows:
EBIT i t þ 1ð Þ ¼ b 0 þ b 1 DCUi þ b 2 ICUi þ b 3 FORMi
þ b 4 CENTi þ b 5 INFOi þ b 6 DCUi
 FORMi þ b 7 DCUi  CENTi
þ b 8 DCUi  INFOi þ b 9 ICUi
 FORMi þ b 10 ICUi  CENTi
þ b 11 ICUi INFOi þ b Controlsþ E i ;
ð2Þ
where EBIT is at tþ 1; DCU (ICU) is direct (indirect) channel
usage; FORM is formalization; CENT is centralization;
INFO is information exchange; Controls refers to a vector
of control variables (EBIT at t, distribution selectivity,
information asymmetry, contractual binding, enforcement,
governance expenses, customer orientation, cost orientation,
and industry concentration); and E is the residual error term
for company i.
However, we needed to account for two potential selection
biases. First, we acquired only objective financial perfor-
mance data from a subset of our surveyed manufacturers.
Therefore, we ran a Heckman selection model with the avail-
ability of secondary data as the dependent variable (1 ¼ sec-
ondary data available) and included the legal form (1¼ public
company) of the company for identification (Vomberg, Hom-
burg, and Gwinner 2020). In addition, we included all control
(except EBIT at t) and focal variables (including their inter-
active effects) from our main model (Equation 2). Second, for
another subset of manufacturers, we obtained sales partner
data. Here, we ran a selection model with the availability of
sales partner data as the dependent variable (1 ¼ sales partner
data available) and included the overall number of sales part-
ners for identification. Thus, we estimated (ignoring
subscripts):
Avail FinData ¼ f þ fFocal þ fControls þ f LEGAL þ z
ð3Þ
Avail Partner ¼ w þ wFocal þ wControls þ w #SALES þ m
ð4Þ
where Avail_FinData (Avail_Partner) is the availability of
financial performance (sales partner) data; Focal is a vector
of the focal variables from Equation 2 and their interactive
effects; Controls is a vector of control variables (Equation 2);
LEGAL is the legal form of the company; #SALES is the
number of sales partners; and z and m are the residual error
terms.
Endogeneity of Multichannel Design and Governance
Mechanisms
Indirect and direct channel usage as well as governance choices
might be endogenous. Prior conflict with sales partners (Sa
Vinhas and Anderson 2005), anticipated levels of competition
between channels (Sa Vinhas and Heide 2015), or anticipated
performance outcomes (Grewal et al. 2013) may determine
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firms’ emphases on them, introducing correlation with the error
term in our model. We rely on the two-step control function
approach (Petrin and Train 2010) to address these endogeneity
concerns: we include the residuals from the first stage (Equa-
tion 5) in the second stage (Equation 6) to correct for potential
endogeneity. To obtain the residuals, we regress the potentially
endogenous variables—direct channel usage, indirect channel
usage, formalization, centralization, and information
exchange—on the variables from our main model (Equation
2). For identification, we additionally regress them on a set of
instrumental variables. We specify the first-stage regression
(ignoring subscripts) as follows:
END ¼ Z þ Z END’ þ Z Controls þ Z Instruments
þ Z IMR þ y;
ð5Þ
where END (END’) is a vector of the potentially endogenous
variables (excluding the focal one); Controls is a vector of the
observed control variables (Equation 2); Instruments is a vector
of instrumental variables (specified next); IMR is a vector of
inverse Mill’s ratios (Equations 3 and 4); and y is a vector of
the error terms.
Note that the control function approach does not require
estimating additional first-stage models for interaction terms
(Papies, Ebbes, and Van Heerde 2017). The difficulty lies in
identifying appropriate instruments that satisfy the criteria for
both relevance (instruments need to correlate with the poten-
tially endogenous variables) and exclusion (instruments must
not correlate with the dependent variable).
Drawing on the theory of institutional isomorphism and
literature on dominant logic, we argue that industry charac-
teristics and market conditions are key determinants of a
firm’s channel management choices (relevance criterion)
(Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002). The theory of institutional
isomorphism proposes that companies often mimic other
companies in their industry to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983). The literature on dominant logic suggests that
in the course of time, industries develop certain mindsets or
“world views” that represent certain ways of doing business
(Prahalad and Bettis 1986). Thus, we argue that the industry-
aggregate measures of channel usage and governance
mechanisms influence a company’s engagement in them
(Antia, Mani, and Wathne 2017). Similarly, industry aggre-
gated measures of customer orientation and cost orientation
are relevant instruments (our results are not sensitive to
including them). Firms competing in customer-oriented mar-
kets might increase channel usage to cater to customer pre-
ferences, and cost-oriented markets may require an efficiency
focus, expanding indirect channel usage (Jindal et al. 2007;
Srinivasan 2006).
The identifying assumption is that peer firms are unlikely to
strategically respond to individual levels of conflict or compe-
tition and performance expectations (exclusion criterion). This
criterion is met. We used a large number of firms to calculate
the focal firm’s instruments. It seems unlikely that peer firms
will take collective actions against a single competitor (i.e.,
stimulate conflict) and then also form other alliances similar
in spirit to act against further competitors (Germann, Ebbes,
and Grewal 2015). Moreover, from the outside, peers cannot
observe competition or performance expectations, which might
even represent tacit knowledge inside the firm (Kogut and
Zander 1992). Thus, they cannot act on them.
Our unique data set allows us to calculate these industry
aggregates. Our matched manufacturer–sales partner data con-
tain 103 cases; however, we collected questionnaires from 499
manufacturers. Significant Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate
F-tests empirically confirm the strength of our instrumental
variables (p < .01). In line with common practice (e.g., Lawr-
ence et al. 2019), small and nonsignificant correlations (r <
.10) between our instrumental variables with firm performance
deliver support for the exclusion criterion.
To correct for the two types of endogeneity in Equation 2,
we include the two inverse Mills ratios from Equations 3 and 4
and the effects of the five residual error terms from Equation 5.
Thus, we estimate the following model:
EBIT i t þ 1ð Þ ¼ b 0 þ b 1DCUi þ b 2ICUi þ b 3FORMi
þ b 4CENTi þ b 5INFOi þ b 6DCUi
 FORMi þb 7DCUi  CENTi
þ b 8DCUi  INFOi þ b 9ICUi
 FORMi þ b 10ICUi  CENTi
þ b 11ICUi  INFOi þ b Controls
þ b IMR þ b y þ E i ;
where IMR is a vector of two inverse Mills ratios (availability of
financial performance data and availability of sales partner data)
and y refers to a vector of endogeneity corrections (Equation 5).
Results
Hypothesis Testing
We relied on ordinary least squares regression with standard
errors clustered at the industry level to estimate our models. We
standardized our variables to account for differences in scaling.
Table 5 displays the regression results. Model 1 shows how
governance mechanisms moderate the effects of multichannel
structure without endogeneity corrections. Model 2 addition-
ally accounts for endogeneity by adding residual terms for
multichannel design and governance mechanisms. We refer
to Model 2 to test our hypotheses. We find that formalization
enhances the performance outcomes of indirect channel usage
(bICU  form ¼ .25, p < .05) while diminishing the outcomes of
direct channel usage (bDCU  form ¼ .91, p < .01). Thus, we
find support for H1a and H1b, respectively. In addition, we
observe that centralization diminishes the performance out-
comes of indirect channel usage (bICU  cent ¼ .12, p <
.05) but enhances the outcomes of direct channel usage
(bDCU  cent ¼ .49, p< .01), in support of H2a and H2b. Finally,
our results indicate that information exchange diminishes the
performance outcomes of indirect channel usage (bICU  info ¼
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.14, p < .01) but enhances the outcomes of direct channel
usage (bDCU  info ¼ .45, p < .01), in support of H3a and H3b.
Floodlight Analysis
To analyze the moderating effects in greater detail, we con-
ducted floodlight analyses at grid values to examine the simple
effects of direct and indirect channel usage contingent on our
moderators (Spiller et al. 2013). Web Appendix W1 displays
the results. We find that moderate to high levels of formaliza-
tion can offset the negative outcomes of indirect channel usage.
However, high levels of centralization and information
exchange lead to negative outcomes.
Moreover, we observe important disordinal interaction
effects for direct channel usage. Moderate to high levels of
formalization provoke negative performance effects of direct
channel usage. Notably, when aligned with low levels of cen-
tralization or information exchange, direct channel usage
entails negative performance outcomes. However, the effect
on these governance mechanisms reverses when such levels
are moderate to high. This finding is important because prior
interfirm research reports predominantly negative effects of
centralization (Frazier 1999). Overall, we find that alignments
between indirect channel usage and formalization enhance per-
formance, whereas alignments between direct channel usage
and centralization and information exchange are beneficial.
Validation Study: Sales Partner Behaviors
Before developing our focal hypotheses on the alignment
effects between multichannel design and governance mechan-
isms, we established the baseline effects of indirect and direct
Table 5. Contingency Effects of Multichannel Design on EBIT Margin.
Model 1 Model 2
Independent variables B SE B SE
Multichannel design
Direct channel usage .16** (.07) .10 (.22)
Indirect channel usage .10* (.08) .18 (.18)
Governance mechanisms
Formalization .11 (.12) .10 (.30)
Centralization .03 (.13) .47 (.37)
Information exchange .23*** (.07) .15* (.10)
Multichannel design  Governance mechanism
Indirect channel usage  formalization H1a .25** (.12) .25** (.12)
Indirect channel usage  centralization H2a .11** (.07) .12** (.06)
Indirect channel usage  information exchange H3a .14*** (.05) .14*** (.06)
Direct channel usage  formalization H1b .90*** (.08) .91*** (.08)
Direct channel usage  centralization H2b .49*** (.08) .49*** (.07)
Direct channel usage  information exchange H3b .41*** (.16) .45*** (.14)
Control variables
Prior performance .39*** (.09) .37*** (.10)
Distribution selectivity .11 (.11) .07 (.13)
Information asymmetry .08 (.08) .18** (.09)
Contractual binding .08 (.08) .06 (.10)
Enforcement .09 (.08) .22 (.16)
Governance expenses .11 (.12) .07 (.16)
Customer orientation .07 (.06) .05 (.07)
Cost orientation .07 (.10) .08 (.11)
Industry concentration .06 (.06) .06 (.06)
Endogeneity corrections
Direct channel usage (residual) .11 (.15)
Indirect channel usage (residual) .11 (.17)
Formalization (residual) .09 (.17)
Centralization (residual) .43* (.28)
Information exchange (residual) .11 (.10)
IMR (secondary data) .02 (.18) .07 (.20)
IMR (sales partner data) .12 (.13) .07 (.20)
Constant .06 (.06) .06* (.04)
R2 .55 .56
N 103 103
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: We display standardized coefficients with standard errors clustered at the industry level. Model 1 contains inverse Mills ratios (IMRs) to account for
potential selection effects due to a lack of secondary performance data and sales partner data. Model 2 additionally accounts for endogeneity through a control
function approach for multichannel design and governance mechanisms.
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channel usage on sales partner behavior (i.e., information
asymmetry and moral hazard). We predicted that direct channel
usage would lower manufacturers’ information disadvantage
compared with sales partners and reduce sales partner moral
hazard. In addition, we predicted that indirect channel usage
would increase moral hazard but would not affect information
asymmetry. We additionally measured sales partners’ informa-
tion advantage over the manufacturer and sales partner coop-
eration with the manufacturer (a manifestation of moral hazard)
in the sales partner survey (see the Appendix). Table 6 reports
the validation study results (see Web Appendix W2 for further
details).
Overall, we find support for our predictions. We observe a
negative relationship between direct channel usage and the
sales partner’s information advantage over the manufacturer
(Model 1: bDCU ¼ .07, p < .05) but no relationship for indi-
rect channel usage (Model 1: bICU ¼ .10, n.s.). Interestingly,
we do not observe linear effects but inverted U-shaped effects
between sales partner cooperation with the manufacturer for
direct (Model 2: bDCU2¼.04, p< .01) and indirect (Model 2:
bICU2 ¼ .19, p < .01) channel usage. (In Web Appendix W2,
we formally establish these inverted U-shape effects in line
with prior literature, e.g., Haans, Pieters, and He 2016; Vom-
berg, Homburg, and Gwinner 2020.) Low to moderate levels of
direct channel usage increase cooperation (reduce moral
hazard) potentially because of a manufacturer’s increased abil-
ity to detect moral hazard. However, high levels of direct
channel usage likely provoke competition, reducing coopera-
tion. In contrast, for indirect channel usage, we observe that the
turning point lies close to the lower end of our observed data
range. Thus, in line with our prediction that indirect channel
usage increases moral hazard, we observe predominantly neg-
ative effects of indirect channel usage on sales partner cooper-
ation with the manufacturer.
Robustness Checks
Endogeneity Assessment: Gaussian Copulas
As an additional endogeneity check, we rely on Gaussian copu-
las (e.g., Ebbes, Papies, and Van Heerde 2016), which repre-
sent an instrument-free method of accounting for endogeneity
(see Web Appendix W3). The Gaussian copula approach repli-
cates all our findings. Because the control function and the
Gaussian copula approach rely on different model-identifying
assumptions but provide consistent results, they strongly sup-
port the validity of our findings.
Multichannel Characteristics: Alternative Specifications
Herfindahl–Hirschman index. We also tested alternative specifi-
cations (for details, see Web Appendix W4). Instead of an
entropy measure (Table 3), we could rely on the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index (HHI) as an alternative method to operatio-
nalize direct and indirect channel usage. Marketing literature
Table 6. Validation Study: Effects of Multichannel Design on Sales Partner Behavior.
Information Advantage of
Focal Sales Partner
(Information Asymmetry)
Sales Partner Cooperation
with Manufacturer
(Moral Hazard)
Model 1 Model 2
Independent Variables B SE B SE
Multichannel design
Direct channel usage .07** (.03) .11* (.07)
Direct channel usage (squared) .04*** (.01)
Indirect channel usage .10 (.09) .07 (.13)
Indirect channel usage (squared) .19*** (.07)
Control variables
Switching costs (sales partner level) .10 (.12) .23*** (.09)
Importance of manufacturer (sales partner level) .14* (.10) .04 (.07)
Frequency of manufacturer change (sales partner level) .03 (.07) .01 (.04)
Customer orientation (sales partner level) .06 (.07) .20*** (.06)
Cost orientation (sales partner level) .03 (.08) .23*** (.06)
Distribution selectivity (manufacturer level) .01 (.06) .07 (.08)
Customer orientation (manufacturer level) .15** (.07) .09 (.10)
Cost orientation (manufacturer level) .05 (.06) .06 (.05)
Industry concentration (industry level) .02 (.02) .04 (.04)
IMR (sales partner data) .12 (.14) .07 (.08)
Constant .01 (.03) .24*** (.08)
Pseudo-R2 .09 .34
N 170 170
*p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01.
Notes: We performed hierarchical linear modeling and display standardized coffiecients with standard errors clustered at the industry level.
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largely relies on the HHI to capture diversity (e.g., Fang, Pal-
matier, and Grewal 2011). We estimated our model (Equation
4) with the alternative HHI specification and replicated all our
findings.
Number of channels weighted by revenues. We tested a measure
that considered relative revenues not by channel but by channel
category (direct vs. indirect; e.g., for Manufacturer A in
Table 3: 2 direct channels  70% revenue from direct channels
¼ .14) (Sa Vinhas and Anderson 2005). Overall, all results but
one interactive effect remained stable (bICU  form ¼ .19, n.s.).
Number of channels.We tested a measure that counted the num-
ber of direct and indirect channels but did not consider the
intensity dimension. Again, all results but one interactive effect
remained stable (bDCU  info ¼ .01, n.s.). Overall, our oper-
ationalization choice did not affect our results. In addition, we
find best model fit in terms of R-square values for the entropy
and HHI specifications, further supporting a joint focus on the
variety and intensity dimensions.
Discussion
We introduce direct and indirect channel usage as focal
design dimensions of multichannel sales systems. In line
with multiple agency theory, we find that direct channel
usage can lower manufacturers’ information disadvantage
compared with sales partners. Low to moderate levels of
direct channel usage also reduce moral hazard concerns,
whereas high levels increase moral hazard. Indirect channel
usage largely provokes moral hazard concerns. How those
sales partner outcomes translate into manufacturer outcomes
critically depends on governance mechanisms, which con-
firms predictions from governance value analysis. Formali-
zation enhances the performance outcomes of indirect
channel usage but diminishes outcomes of direct channel
usage. Conversely, centralization and information exchange
with sales partners enhance the performance outcomes of
direct channel usage but diminish outcomes of indirect
channel usage. These results have important implications
for research and practice.
Research Implications
First, our investigation extends prior research that compares
differences between multichannel and nonmultichannel set-
tings (Table 1) by exploring variation within multichannel set-
tings (Antia, Mani, and Wathne 2017; Srinivasan 2006). Prior
research demonstrates that the mere presence of direct channels
within a sales system can increase agency conflicts (e.g., Heide
2003). We build on this information and show that the degree
of channel usage can differently affect agency conflicts. Future
research could further explore intradesign differences from an
internal perspective. We focused on agency conflicts with
external sales partners; however, agency conflicts might also
arise within direct channels: the direct sales force may perceive
substitution threats from direct online channels (Lawrence
et al. 2019), or employees may question management’s ability
to cater to the specific interests of their own sales channels
while supporting indirect sales channels (Sa Vinhas and Ander-
son 2005), provoking agency conflicts.
Second, our results emphasize the importance of aligning
governance mechanisms with multichannel design, an issue
that has received limited attention (cf. Ghosh and John 2005;
Heide, Kumar, and Wathne 2014). Extending prior research
that demonstrates that the effects of governance mechanisms
can vary between multichannel and nonmultichannel settings
(Table 1), we show that the same governance mechanism can
have divergent performance effects within multichannel set-
tings. For example, centralization enhances direct channel
usage by leveraging firsthand knowledge. However, centraliza-
tion reduces the performance effect of indirect channels usage.
Of note, these interactive effects differ within categories of
governance mechanisms: Both formalization and centralization
represent manifestations of formal governance; however, they
result in opposing effects. In addition, although prior research
indicates that informal governance (i.e., solidarity norms) can
be less effective for multichannel settings (Heide, Kumar, and
Wathne 2014), our findings imply that informal governance
(i.e., information exchange) can still be effective depending
on multichannel design characteristics.
Overall, these observations underscore the need for further
research on the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in
multichannel settings. For example, research could explore
whether manufacturers’ engagement in direct channels simi-
larly strengthens the performance effects of other intrusive
governance mechanisms, such as behavioral monitoring
(Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007). Moreover, we separately
investigate the effects of the fundamentally different
approaches of formal and informal governance. Extant research
demonstrates counterbalancing (Jap and Ganesan 2000) and
reinforcing effects (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Vomberg, Hom-
burg, and Gwinner 2020). Therefore, we call for further
research on their joint effects in multichannel settings.
Third, we address calls to link governance mechanisms to
financial performance (Heide 2003) and thus extend initial
research in this area (e.g., Heide, Kumar, and Wathne 2014).
Importantly, we contribute to the theoretical discussion by inte-
grating governance value analysis and multiple agency theory.
Such an integration is possible because the underlying assump-
tions of both theories are compatible or at least are not incon-
sistent. Both share the behavioral assumptions of bounded
rationality and (boundedly) self-interest-seeking actors and
focus on minimizing direct and opportunity costs (e.g., Eisen-
hardt 1989; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).
Integration expands the theories’ individual partial views of
the world (e.g., Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992). Governance
value analysis complements agency theory by emphasizing that
exchange partners strive to achieve joint value because doing
so also maximizes their own profits (Ghosh and John 1999).
Thus, resolving agency conflicts does not only induce order but
can also create value. A focus on joint value also puts the focus
on both sides of the principal–agent dyad and thereby
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complements agency theory’s dominant principal focus.
Finally, multiple agency theory complements governance
value analysis by helping us understand how interactions out-
side the dyadic relationship affect performance.
We suggest taking this integration as a starting point and call
for further research on financial performance effects of govern-
ance mechanisms. Prior research provides rich evidence for the
potential of governance mechanisms to create order (e.g., sup-
pressing opportunism). However, governance mechanisms can
yield complex effects on preeconomic outcomes (e.g., formaliza-
tion reduces opportunism but also customer outcomes; Sa Vinhas
and Heide 2011). Thus, studies on financial performance effects
are important, as theymay complement prior research by demon-
strating net effects, which are highly relevant to managers.
Relatedly, we call for research that integrates recent agency
extensions, such as behavioral agency theory (Hoenen and
Kostova 2015), which may offer additional theoretical insights
(e.g., inclusion of trust). Behavioral agency, for example, could
be relevant for investigating whether (and when) cooperation
between sales partners not only hurts (as multiple agency the-
ory predicts) but also benefits the manufacturer (El Akremi,
Mignonac, and Perrigot 2011).
Managerial Implications
Our study’s focal managerial implication is that managers need
to align multichannel design with governance choices, as mul-
tichannel designs can provoke sales partner moral hazard. For
example, high levels of direct channel usage can induce sales
partners to cooperate against the manufacturer. However, the
results of our study imply that governance choices significantly
affect whether such sales partner behavior also affects manu-
facturer performance.
Manufacturers benefit from aligning direct channel usage
with centralized decision making. Similarly, also maintaining
information exchange with indirect channels strengthens the
performance effects of such a multichannel design. However,
governing indirect channel usage requires a different govern-
ance approach: Manufacturers should adopt formalized rules
and procedures in this context. This finding calls to mind the
experience of the manager we mentioned at the outset of the
study. To end the feud with sales partners that began producing
the manufacturer’s product on their own, the manufacturer and
sales partners developed agreed-on rules and procedures. One
formalized rule stipulated that sales partners could distribute
the product only in countries where the manufacturer did not
have a presence. As multichannel sales systems tend to develop
over time, this also implies that managers need to regularly
reevaluate the appropriateness of their governance approaches.
Otherwise, they may fall prey to inertia traps, in which man-
agers stick with established but inefficient governance mechan-
isms (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002).
To illustrate our point, we demonstrate the performance
effects of centralization for different combinations of multi-
channel designs. We focus on centralization because anecdotal
evidence suggests that manufacturers tend to prefer centralized
decision making. We reestimated our main model and included
the three-way interaction between centralization, direct chan-
nel usage, and indirect channel usage (p > .10). We calculated
the marginal effects of centralization at low (m  2s) and high
(m  2s) levels of both indirect and direct channel usage. At
low levels of direct channel usage, centralization hampers man-
ufacturer performance for low ( qEBITqCENT ¼ 1 :48; p< .01) and
high ( qEBITqCENT ¼ 1 :41; p < .01) levels of indirect channel
usage. However, high levels of direct channel usage mitigate
the negative performance of centralization for high levels of
indirect channel usage ( qEBITqCENT ¼  :06; n.s.) and reverse those
effects for low indirect channel usage ( qEBITqCENT ¼ 1 :05; p <
.01). Thus, to enhance their financial performance, manufac-
turers with little direct channel usage should decentralize deci-
sion making.
Appendix. Study Measures.
Measures ILa IRa
Financial performance
EBIT scaled by total assets [%]
Direct channel usage and indirect channel usage (M)b
(inspired by Jindal et al. 2007; Van Bruggen et al. 2010)
Please specify the share of turnover (pij) your firm/business unit realizes in the following channels: NA
c
 Direct sales force (p1,1) ___ %
 Own outlets (p2,1) ___ %
 Own telephone sales/call center (p3,1) ___ %
 Own direct marketing (mail, catalog) (p4,1) ___ %
 Own online shops, portals, marketplaces (p5,1) ___ %
 Retailers/specialist dealers (p1,2) ___ %
 Wholesalers (p2,2) ___ %
 External sales representatives (p3,2) ___ %
 External telephone sales/call center (p4,2) ___ %
 External direct marketing (mail, catalog) (p5,2) ___ %
 External online-shops, portals, marketplaces (p6,2) ___ %
(continued)
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Appendix. (continued)
Measures ILa IRa
Formalization (M) (based on Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, and Thomas 2007) [CR ¼ .91; AVE ¼ .72; CA ¼ .91]d
 We define clear rules and procedures for our sales partners.
 Our contacts with our sales partners are on a formal, preplanned basis.
 There are standard procedures and rules to be followed by every sales partner.
 Our sales partners have to conform to formal guidelines and written rules.
.79
.78
.92
.89
.63
.61
.85
.79
Centralization (M) (adapted from Dwyer and Welsh 1985; Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, and Thomas 2007) [CR ¼ .76; AVE ¼ .52;
CA ¼ .76]
 There can be little action taken in our sales system until we make decisions.
 Our sales partners cannot go ahead with actions without checking with us.
 Any decision a channel member makes regarding our product has to have our approval.
.68
.77
.71
.46
.59
.51
Information exchange (M) (based on Heide and John 1992) [CR ¼ .90; AVE ¼ .69; CA ¼ .89]
 We exchange information about relevant occurrences with our sales partners.
 We informally exchange information with our sales partners.
 We exchange more information with our sales partners than originally intended.
 We expect our sales partners to forward relevant information to us.
.73
.94
.88
.74
.54
.88
.77
.56
Distribution selectivity (M) (based on Fein and Anderson 1997) [CR ¼ .81; AVE ¼ .59; CA ¼ .81]
 We try to keep the number of sales partners per trade area low.
 We assign exclusive trade areas to sales partners.
 We do not assign additional sales partners to the existing trade areas of other partners.
.67
.78
.83
.45
.62
.69
Information asymmetry (M) (inspired by Heide 2003) [CR ¼ .89; AVE ¼ .73; CA ¼ .88]
 We have more information about our relevant markets than our sales partners.
 We know more about our end customers than our sales partners.
 In general, we have more knowledge about end customers and markets than our sales partners.
.70
.87
.97
.49
.76
.95
Contractual binding (M) (own development) [CR ¼ .89; AVE ¼ .68; CA ¼ .89]
 We have contracts with our sales partners that closely bind us.
 We have contracts with our sales partners that bind us for a long time.
 We have contracts with our sales partners that preclude the quick exchange of sales partners.
 We have contracts with our sales partners that impede the termination of our relationships.
.83
.92
.85
.68
.69
.85
.72
.46
Enforcement (M) (own development) [CR ¼ .84; AVE ¼ .58; CA ¼ .84]
 We exert pressure on our sales partners so that they comply with our decisions.
 We exert pressure on our sales partners so that they do not buy from competing manufacturers.
 We exert pressure on our sales partners so that they invest in marketing activities.
 We exert pressure on our sales partners so that they adopt our new products.
.72
.85
.63
.81
.52
.73
.40
.66
Governance expenses (M) (own development) [CR ¼ .86; AVE ¼ .68; CA ¼ .86]
 The governance of our sales partners involves high personnel expenses.
 The governance of our sales partners involves high IT expenses.
 The governance of our sales partners is very costly.
.77
.73
.94
.60
.54
.89
Customer orientation (M), (SP) (adapted from Narver and Slater 1990) [CR¼ .84b (.80)e; AVE¼ .58 (.50); CA¼ .84 (.79)
 A core part of our company strategy is the creation of customer value.
 We steadily monitor our efforts for satisfying customer needs.
 Our competitive advantage is based on the understanding of customer needs.
 Our main target is satisfying our customers.
.73b (.66)e
.79 (.73)
.81 (.80)
.71 (.61)
.53 (.44)
.62 (.53)
.65 (.64)
.50 (.37)
Cost orientation (M), (SP) (based on Homburg, Workman, and Krohmer 1999) [CR ¼ .82b (.86)e; AVE ¼ .48 (.55);
CA ¼ .82 (.85)]
 Pursuing operating efficiencies is one of our most important business targets.
 We put special emphasis on keeping operative costs on a low.
 We continuously pursue improving our production processes in order to reduce costs.
 Pursuing economies of scale and economies of scope are central elements of our strategy.
 We strictly control our business processes.
.75b (.68)e
.65 (.64)
.74 (.85)
.64 (.73)
.69 (.79)
.56 (.46)
.42 (.41)
.55 (.72)
.41 (.53)
.47 (.63)
Industry concentration
 HHI: Sum of squared market shares (SIC code)
Information advantage (SP)e (inspired by Heide 2003) [CR ¼ .82; AVE ¼ .60; CA ¼ .82]
 We have more information about our relevant markets than the manufacturer.
 We know more about our end customers than the manufacturer.
 In general, we have more knowledge about end customers and markets than the manufacturer.
.76
.78
.78
.58
.61
.61
(continued)
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